ZAMBIA: HICHILEMA’S FIRST 100 DAYS, A CLASH OF EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY

By Chiwoyu Sinyangwe

Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND) swept to victory after 23 years in opposition thanks to growing resentment of the former ruling Patriotic Front (PF) by ordinary Zambians who wanted “change.”

The people wanted change

His populist elections campaign promises resonated very well with most Zambians, especially the youth desperate for jobs. This ultimately catalysed Lungu’s fall.

“If we have to give a benefit of doubt, I would say 9 out 10,” says Vice-President Mutale Nalumango in her reflection of the first 100 days of the UPND in office.

In stark contrast to Nalumango’s assessment, the reality on the ground indicates that Hichilema and the UPND are dealing with a different reality. They are left to deal with finding a solution to rebuild the economy of the country; a feat that Zambians are starting to lose patience on.

With the former ruling Patriotic Front in disarray and besieged by internal wrangles, the ruling UPND should be enjoying a smooth ride for the next five years given other oppositionists are mostly small, fragmented parties with no strong grass root support.

However, the UPND faces stiff opposition from ordinary Zambians, the majority poor natives popularly called the ‘2.8’, after Hichilema won 2, 852,348 million votes against Lungu’s 1,870,780.

‘I used to think life would improve with the removal of PF’

“I am yet to see the impact of this change,” says Margaret Muteto who sells her fares by the roadside in the Kanyama slum, west of Lusaka.

Hichilema rode to victory on the support of the highly restive urban dwellers who comprise mostly youths and women. He promised to revamp the economy, create jobs and end widespread corruption rampant under PF rule.

“I voted for change but there is still no money in the country, no business [customers], we are still experiencing load shedding [power cuts)] cost of things [essential commodities] is still beyond reach…I used to think life would improve with the removal of PF but nothing,” Mutelo complains.

He also promised to reverse the breakdown of rule of law, de-politicise the ineffective civil service and improve Zambia’s international image that suffered under Lungu.

But Hichilema is struggling to satisfy the expectations of the young Zambian people. On social media, they accuse Hichilema of overlooking the youth in appointments to key government positions and images of appointed ‘old people’ in Hichilema’s regime are frequently shared.

“Did you see these old people anywhere when we were spending nights in the trenches, risking our lives from the brutal PF regime?” asks Nathan Lisulo, a Lusaka-based youth who campaigned heavily for the UPND and was twice incarcerated.

Lisulo complains about low youth representation in Hichilema’s government and the appointment of mostly men.

The PF constitution forbade non-PF members from serving in key positions both in government and state-owned-organisations, giving impetus to UPND supporters, especially the young people to call for immediate sweeping changes to key appointments.

In the first 100 days Hichilema insisted on not firing all PF remnants at once, claiming he was being “methodical” in his approach but that upset his power base demanding the government be pruned immediately.

“Unlike his predecessors, Hichilema was always bound to have it difficult to govern because his victory is not because of his tradition[al] power base but from urban voters who were frustrated with the PF – in fact, the UPND victory is partly due to the vote from some frustrated PF members,” says Alex Mwila, a Lusaka-based political scientist.

“These guys [UPND] have a lot of interests to satisfy and this is not easy at all,” he adds.

Expansionary budget

In its first fiscal budget, the UPND government says it plans to spend ZK173bn ($10.8bn) in 2022 compared to the ZK139bn spent this year, with a focus in spending in social sectors such as education, health, social welfare and agriculture.

The expenditure pattern is a stark shift from the PF which prioritised infrastructure projects that caused the public debt to balloon to 128.7% of GDP last year; one of the highest ratios in Africa.

For the first time in Zambia’s history, finance minister Situmbeko Musokwatane announced the government will recruit 30, 000 teachers and about 11,000 health workers to make a dent in the huge numbers of unemployed, but trained youths, and also to improve service delivery.

Simultaneously, the new government has also abolished school fees for primary and secondary education while funding to constituencies through the Constituency Development Fund has also been elevated to ZK25.7m from ZK1.6m, as the government seeks to increase its footprint in mostly opposition strongholds.

Betting on the IMF programme

Zambia’s economy is buckling under heavy indebtedness with the country’s external debt at $14.5bn, of which 60% is held by Chinese companies and lenders responsible for massive infrastructure projects.

The International Monetary Fund has reached a Staff-Level Agreement on a programme under its Extended Credit Facility arrangement that envisages financial support of $1.4bn to Zambia over the next three years.

This will be in addition to the $1.3bn special drawing rights allocation that was received in August 2021.

Zambia desperately needs to restructure its external debt to get relief from interest payments obligations that gobbles up to 42% of the country’s revenues. Zambia’s $750m matures next year, but the country has no capacity to pay back and in the absence of the IMF deal, default was almost inevitable.

“To dismantle the debt, you need an IMF programme – it is an endorsement of credibility. Now, we are going to the lenders to deal with the debt restructuring,” Hichilema said in Lusaka.

With the Zambian economy expected to marginally rebound to 3.3% and 3.5% in 2022, after suffering its first recession in 2020 alongside the effects of Covid-19, the government is banking on removing energy subsidies to fund social sectors.

Currently, Zambia spends $800m per year subsidising fuel consumption and $500m per year on electricity subsidies, translating into $1.3bn per year on energy subsidies.

Musokotwane says there would be no fuel subsidy in the 2022 national budget.

“Yes the price will go up because the country over-borrowed but don’t be scared, we are human beings. We have tried everything possible to moderate it…we are just shifting support from your car tank so that we can hire teachers and nurses,” says Musokotwane.

Musokotwane’s revelations have heightened apprehension among Zambians over an IMF deal. The majority of Zambians want the government to restructure the debt but not via the IMF.

The IMF is loathed in Zambia after its economic reforms – structural adjustment programme – of the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s shut a number of state-owned companies, the majority which were loss making, resulting in a jump in the rate of unemployment while other social ills such as crime, uncontrolled urbanization, destitution, and poverty grew steadily.

However, the IMF says the current programme is focused on reviving Zambia’s economy and guaranteeing employment creation and increased social sector spending.

Consolidating power base

Hichilema is often described by those close to him as untrusting and often prefers to centralise power around his lean pool of advisors and close confidants who include wealthy Lusaka entrepreneurs Muna Hantuba, Valentine Chitalu and Diego Casilli among others.

Apart from finance minister Musokotwane, Hichilema’s other appointments of ministers especially to key ministries like mining and energy are generally considered weak and less competent, partly reflecting the belief that the President wants to retain full authority over key sectors of the economy.

Traditionally, the President always returns five advisors, but Hichilema has hired more aides by creating a series of new advisory positions in a move seen by many in Lusaka as an attempt to increase the number of staff working in the presidency.

The PF factor and regionalism

The UPND has built a stronghold in the majority of the Southern, Western and North Western provinces. Hichilema had campaigned on the promise of delivering a cabinet representative of all 10 provinces.

All five heads of Zambia’s defence and security services are held by people from the three provinces. The Speaker of Parliament and the nominated chief justice also follow the trend. Hichilema’s 27-person cabinet has 16 ministers from ethnic groups in the Southern, Western and North Western provinces.

This is unsettling PF members especially those affiliated to the Bemba group. The PF has an historic support base from the Bemba-speaking population. In the aftermath of the 12 August polls, the PF has been lining up a Bemba native to replace Lungu who had indicated plans to hand over power in June 2022.

Chishimba Kambwili, a Bemba member, is largely expected to take over from Lungu. This could be a new frontier for Hichilema oppositionists in Bemba-speaking regions, especially in the urban areas.

Kambwili, ostracized by Lungu in 2016, was recalled to the party when it became apparent Lungu had lost the support of the Bemba-speaking regions.

He could also exploit Hichilema’s failure to incorporate more figures from Bemba-speaking regions and other underrepresented sections of the economy such as women and the youth in the UPND government.

Hichilema remains vulnerable to a formidable PF adversary who could combine populist policies in Lusaka and the Copperbelt – the two urban regions that moved to support the UPND on its promise of restoration of the economy and public order.

y after 23 years in opposition thanks to growing resentment of the former ruling Patriotic Front (PF) by ordinary Zambians who wanted “change.”